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First,  a look at some dimensions of the political economy that can
be  measured  objectively,  more  or  less.  The  purpose  of this  initial
foray  is  to  look  for  signs  of how  much  or how little the  nation  is
changing.  Next,  I  slip  into  a more  cosmic  sphere, that  of attitudes,
beliefs, and values.
This  takes  us  into  the  realm  of the  pollster  and  his attempts  to
determine  what  people  think  (or at least  say  they think)  about the
world.  Here  the  aim  is  to  search  for  reasons  behind  some  of the
changes observed  in the first step.  This  is followed  by a brief review
of the political  scene.  Finally, the lessons of these intellectual excur-
sions are  applied toward  answering the initial question:  is the United
States  at  a  watershed  in  its  approach  to  the  political  economy?
Some Dimensions of the Current Political Economy
Political  economy,  in  its  broadest  possible  sense,  is broken  into
three  parts:  demographic,  economic,  and  governmental.  Within  each
part,  I will concentrate  on those characteristics or changes that might
suggest  a  turning  point  in  some  important  aspect  of the  American
political economy.
Demographic
Viewed  over  the  span  of two or three decades,  the demographic
make-up  of  the  United  States  has  undergone  rather  remarkable
change.  Fortunately for analytical purposes, these changes are gradual
in comparison  with economic or political change.
Slower population growth. Perhaps  the most important change of
all  and  the  one  that  effects  nearly  everything  else  is  the  sharply
reduced  rate  of  childbearing.  The  rate  has  been  more  than  halved
since the late  1950s,  falling from nearly  3.7 births per woman to the
current  rate  of  1.8.  Not  only  does  this  factor  materially  shape
everything from the  size of the labor force and the consumer market
to the  type of  public  services demanded,  its influence  persists for a
generation or more.
3An aging population. The declining birth rate, in combination with
increased  life  expectancy,  is  resulting  in  a  significant  aging of the
American  population.  Although  this trend  will be interrupted  in the
late  1980s  as  women  of the post  World  War  II  "baby boom"  reach
their  prime  childbearing  years,  the  interruption  (referred  to  as the
"baby boom  echo")  will  be temporary.  By  the late 1990s, the aging
process  will  have  resumed  and  by  the  year  2030,  the  elderly  are
expected  to account  for about  18 percent  of the population, nearly
double  their  current  share.  Although  the  average  retirement  age
could  rise  slightly,  it  will  not do  so rapidly  enough  to forestall  the
effects of a rising dependency ratio.
The  combination  of increased  longevity  and  increased  economic
security  for  individuals  of  retirement  age  also  has  increased  the
residential  mobility of many older people. Not only are these retirees
more  mobile,  but  they  tend  to  concentrate  in  particular  regions,
often in rural locations.
Sexual  discrimination  occurs  in  life  expectancy  trends  too.  Yet,
here is one case where the outcome is decidely in favor of the female,
as  the  gap  between  male  and  female  life  expectancies  continues  to
widen.  A male  child  born in  1980 can expect to live 72 years while a
female  child, on  average,  can  expect  to live  81  years.  It is estimated
that no more than one wife in four will avoid widowhood.
Deconcentration.  Americans  began moving away from the cities in
the  Fifties.  Since  1950,  population  densities  within  central  cities
have  fallen,  declining  from around  7,500  people  per  square  mile  to
less  than  4,000.  During  the  Fifties  and  Sixties,  the  movement  was
primarily  toward  the suburbs.  However,  in  the Seventies the decon-
centration  trend  spread to  rural areas,  including  some  areas that  are
sparsely populated and distant from urban centers.
Residential  preference  surveys had long shown that proportionately
more  Americans  wanted  to  live  in  small  towns  or the  countryside
than  actually  lived  there.  Yet,  it  was  not until  the  1970s that the
combination  of  increased  job  opportunities,  reduced  displacement
from agricultural and  extractive industries,  and the increased mobility
of retirees  made  it possible  for large  numbers  of people  to actualize
their preferences.
A  Changing Family/Household Structure. For a variety of reasons,
household formation  is  now increasing somewhat faster than popula-
tion.  Young  adults  are  moving  away  from  home  earlier  and  post-
poning  marriage  longer.  People  are  generally  living  longer,  divorcing
with  greater  frequency,  and  maintaining  homes  after  retirement
longer.  For the first  time  in our nation's  history,  more  than half of
all  households  consist  of no  more  than  two  people.  The  increase  in
the number  of single-parent  families has been particularly striking. It
is  estimated  that  more  than  half  of  all  children  born  in  1980  will
spend  a  significant  part  of their  childhoods  with  only  one  parent.
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And,  despite  skyrocketing  prices,  the  rate of home  ownership  con-
tinues  to rise.  The  percentage  has risen from  62 percent  in  1960 to
66  percent  in  1980  and  is  projected  to reach  67 percent  by 1990.
Ethnic and racial minorities. Blacks,  Asians, other racial minorities,
and  Hispanics  (the  largest  ethnic  minority)  now account for about
19 percent  of the population.  Given their  high birth rates, this share
will  increase  slightly  with  time.  Immigration  continues  to  be  an
important  source  of  population  growth.  About  400,000  people
per  year  enter the United  States  as  legal  immigrants.  No one  knows
how  many  illegal  immigrants reside in the U.S. but estimates seem to
range from 3 to 6 million.
The Economy
As  an  issue,  the  economy  has  dominated  the  national  policy
scene  for the better part of the last decade, and will more than likely
go  on  dominating  it  through  at  least  the  first  half  of the  present
decade.  There  are  so  many  views  of  the  American  economy  these
days  - supply-side  economics,  the M1-B  target  range,  Laffer curves,
safety  nets  - that one hesitates to enter the fray for fear of enlarging
on  the general state of confusion.  One hesitates, but then goes on for
this is "where it's at," as they say.
A Slowing of Productivity Growth. This is the crux of the problem.
Higher  productivity  has  long  been  the  major  source  of  economic
growth  in the  United States.  It has, therefore,  been a key ingredient
in the  prosperity  and  affluence  that most  Americans  have  come  to
know  and  expect.  Beyond  making  it  possible  for  most  people  to
enjoy a higher standard of living, this growth in the size of our overall
economic  pie  made  economic adjustments  and  the redistribution  of
economic  benefits  less painful.  And, it did so over a sustained  period
of  time.  While real  growth  has averaged about  3.3 percent  annually
since  1890, it was  in the  1950s and  1960s that it reached its histor-
ical peak of over 4 percent.
Then,  in the  1970s this growth rate slowed to 2.9 percent.  While a
slowdown of this magnitude is serious in its own right,  more ominous
is the fact  that it occurred  despite  a  significant  increase  in both the
number  of workers  and  the number  of hours  worked.  Thus,  growth
in output per hour (labor productivity) was more than halved between
1960 and  1970. Overall productivity  followed  a similar pattern. And,
since  the growth  in the labor supply that helped offset this dramatic
fall  in  productivity  is  unlikely  to  continue,  the  need  to  stimulate
productivity becomes all the more urgent.
Higher Rates of Inflation. More  than any  other single  issue, infla-
tion has dominated  the attention of the public and the policymakers
alike  over  the  past  decade.  Historically,  and  growing  out  of the
experience  of  the  Great  Depression,  Americans  have  paid  more
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tion.  The  experience  of the  1930s  was  ground  into  the  psyche  of
the  American  labor  force,  at  least  until  recently.  In  the  1970s  this
priority reversed  - and for good reason. While inflation had averaged
only  2.3 percent  annually  in  the 1960s, by the last half of the 1970s
it had  reached  an annual  rate of 8.2  percent.  The  purchasing  power
of  the  dollar  was  cut  in  half  during  the  1970s  due  to  inflation.
This  inflation  was  fed  by  a number  of factors,  the relative impor-
tance  of  which  is  a  subject  of  continuing  debate.  The  phenomenal
rise in energy  prices since 1973,  higher food prices in 1972 and 1973,
unit-labor  costs  in  excess  of productivity  gains,  large  federal  budget
deficits,  a monetary policy that permitted the money supply to grow
rapidly,  and  a  series  of individual  program  and policy decisions that
incrementally  reduced  productivity  or added to  cost are among the
causes of this inflation.
International Interdependence.  Increased  U.S.  involvement  in
international  trade  over  the  past  two  or  three decades  has dramat-
ically  altered  the  nature  and  extent  of  our  relations  with  other
nations of the world. As a percent of GNP, both imports and exports
have  risen from  about  5 percent  in  1960 to  6 percent in 1970 to 11
percent  in  1979.  In  the  case  of food,  we  have  increased  our domi-
nance  of  the  world  grain  trade  while  the  rest  of the world  has  be-
come more dependent on U.S. supplies.
In  the early  1950s the U.S.  supplied  only  about  2  percent  of the
rest  of the worlds'  agricultural  needs;  we  now supply  about 11  per-
cent  and  the share is rising. For some other products, it is the United
States  that has  become  more  dependent  on imports  from  abroad. A
recent  report  by  the  Comptroller  General  of  the  United  States
estimates  that  by  1985,  the U.S.  will  import  as  much  as half of its
basic supply of raw materials.
Poverty  and  Income  Distribution. In  the  1960s,  poverty  was  a
national  issue that  received  major policy  attention.  Those  were  the
days of the poor peoples' march on Washington and Lyndon Johnson's
Great  Society.  New  programs  and  agencies  were  designed  and  old
ones redirected  to  address  the problems of poverty. Partly as a result
of  this  massive  effort,  poverty  in  America  fell  dramatically  in  the
1960s.  The  absolute  number of people below the poverty line fell by
more  than one-third  between  1960  and  1970, and the incidence  was
cut from 22.2 percent to 12.6 percent.
In  the  1970s,  the  progress  in alleviating  poverty  slowed  substan-
tially,  based  on the official poverty numbers. Although the incidence
fell  slightly,  the absolute  number  of poor people fell very  little. Yet,
an  important  qualification  must  be  noted  here.  Since  the  Census
Bureau  estimate  does  not  take  into  account  the  value  of  in-kind
transfers,  which  have  risen  dramatically  over  this  period,  it  under-
estimates the improvement  that has been  achieved.  As  an indication
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incidence  of  poverty  in  1974  would  have  been  7.8  percent  rather
than the Census  estimate  of  11.2 percent if the in-kind transfers had
been  counted  as income.  Thus,  the slow down in progress was not as
great as the Census Bureau estimates might suggest.
A  look  at  trends  in  income  distribution  over  the  past  30  years
reveals  a  different  dimension  of  the  same  phenomenon.  Between
1948  and  1977,  per  capita  household  income  became  somewhat
more  equally  distributed.  Yet,  the  distribution  of  wage  and  salary
earnings  (one  of  several  sources  of  household  income),  moved  in
exactly the opposite direction, toward greater inequality.
How  then  has  overall  household  income  become  more  equally
distributed  if  wages  and  salaries  have  become  less  so?  The  answer:
government  transfer  payments-social  security,  public  assistance,
unemployment,  veterans  payments,  federal  retirement,  etc.  As  a
percent  of GNP, government transfer payments rose from  4.1 percent
in  1956  to  10.7  percent  in 1978. Without  these  transfer  payments,
it  has been  estimated that the  share  of income  going to  the bottom
quintile of households  would  have been more than cut in half during
the post-World  War  II period.  Half the income going to the elderly is
from government transfer payments. And this does not even  consider
the  very  substantial  contribution  of  in-kind  aid,  such  as  from  the
food stamp program.
Entry  of  Women  in  the Labor Force. Another  interesting  thing
that happened  on the way  to the 1980s was that women entered the
labor force  in unprecedented  numbers.  Between  1950 and 1980, the
proportion of all women age  16 and over  in the labor force rose from
31  to  51  percent.  To give a further sense of proportion, of the 3 mil-
lion workers  who joined  the national  labor force  in  1979,  2  million
were  women.  Although  this  phenomenon  receives  surprisingly little
attention, the implications, both economic and social, are far-reaching.
Most  of the  increase  in female  participation  has occurred  among
women under 35 years of age. In fact, of all women 25 to 34 years of
age  in 1979, fully 64 percent were  in the labor market. In contrast to
past times  when  women  dropped  out  of the labor force  during the
child-raising  years,  many  now  continue to work. This,  of  course,  is
not  unrelated  to  the  rapid  increase  in  single-parent  households.  A
recent  Population  Reference  Bureau  study  found that  more than 40
percent of mothers with children under 3 years of age were employed
or seeking employment.
There are several important economic implications of the increased
participation  of  women  in the labor force.  This increased  participa-
tion  contributed  importantly  to  offsetting  the  adverse  effects  of
declining  productivity.  Yet,  it  is  not  possible  to foresee  where  this
trend  will  go  in the future.  It very  well could  have  neared  its upper
limit, at least for the near term.
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tion of income.  Female  participation rates are the highest, have risen
the  most,  and  are  adding  the most to family  earnings  among  those
households  in the second  and  third quintiles  from  the bottom.  As a
result,  these  higher  rates  (in  combination  with  increased  transfer
payments  to the lowest  quintile) are largely responsible for the more
equal  distribution  of income that has occurred over the past 30 years
or so.  However,  to the  extent  female participation rates go higher, it
is likely to be among households in the highest income classes.
This  is  beginning  to be evident  in  the growing  number  of women
in  occupations  that  have  long  been  male  dominated.  For example,
between  1960 and  1980, the share of physicians who are women rose
from  6.8  to  13.4  percent,  lawyers  and  judges  3.3 to 12.8  percent,
and  financial  officers  of banks  12.4 to 33.6 percent. Thus, while the
rise  in  female  labor  force  participation  has  in  the  recent past con-
tributed  to  a  greater  equality  of income  distribution,  it is likely  to
have the opposite effect in the future.
Increased  female  participation  in  the  labor  market  is  also  begin-
ning to influence  labor  mobility.  In  1979, two-career  families repre-
sented  52  percent  of  U.S.  marriages,  up from  47 percent  only  four
years  earlier.  This factor,  among others, is credited for the increasing
resistance  of  the  American  worker  to  relocation.  Other  causes  in-
clude  housing  costs,  the  growing emphasis  on leisure  activities,  and
the nonmovable  features of several transfer payment programs.
An interesting  footnote to this discussion is that male participation
in the labor force  has been headed in the opposite direction.  Between
1960 and  1980  it fell from  83.3 to  77.2 percent.  Earlier  retirement
and  changing  social  attitudes  toward  work  are  two  of  the  reasons
cited.
Government
A  number  of features  of the governmental  process  are worthy  of
note.  Three  will  be  discussed  here:  fragmentation,  the changing role
of  government,  and  the separation  of government  from  the people.
Fragmentation. By all odds, the most significant feature of govern-
ment  today,  especially  the federal  government,  is the high degree of
fragmentation  that exists  throughout the policymaking  process. The
trend toward  political  fragmentation  has taken many  forms. Among
interest  groups,  it  has  resulted  in  a  rapid growth  in the number  of
special interest  groups and a loss in the relative influence of the more
general  interest  groups  (e.g.,  political  parties,  national  business
organizations,  and general farm organizations).
There  are  now  about  2,500  trade  associations  and  professional
groups  headquartered  in  Washington,  D.C.,  about  a  third  of  the
national  total.  As  you  might  guess,  they  have  not  chosen  this site
because  they  like  Washington  summers  or  enjoy  dodging  out-of-
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narrower points-of-view on the policy process.
To  help  offset  the  narrower  and  narrower  political  base  these
groups  represent,  they  have  added  a new wrinkle  called the  "polit-
ical  action committee"  or PAC (read "money").  If the popularity of
these  groups  is  any  indication,  their  benefactors  have  apparently
discovered  that  money  is  a  close  substitute  for  a  broader  political
base  when it comes  to attracting  the attention of many members of
Congress.  Given  the  high  cost  of running  election  campaigns,  this
should come as no great surprise. PAC contributions to Congressional
candidates  have  risen from  $1.2.5  million  in  1974 to $55  million  in
1980.
Fragmentation  is  also  a  prominent  feature  of the federal  govern-
ment.  Within the  Executive  Branch there has been an increase  in the
number  of offices  and  agencies,  especially  at the Cabinet  and White
House  levels,  and  the responsibility  for decisionmaking  has become
more widely  shared.  This has been particularly obvious in the case of
food and agricultural policy but is not limited to this topic.
Although  it  receives  less  public  attention,  the  same  thing  has
happened  in  Congress.  The number  of subcommittees  in the House
of Representatives  has more than doubled  over the past  30 years to
the present  147.  Not surprisingly, the overlapping responsibility that
results  from  this  adds to  the  complexity  of the legislative  process.
For  example,  during the  first  five  months of the  Second Session  of
the  96th  Congress  in  1980,  617  energy  bills  were  split  among  19
separate  House  committees  and  1,806  health bills were  split among
18 committees.
Since  nearly  half  of  all  House  members  serve  on  5 or more  sub-
committees,  the pace  is hectic, to  put it mildly. A 1977 House com-
mission  on  Administrative  Review,  chaired  by  Congressman  David
Obey,  estimated  that the average  member  has about 11  free minutes
during the work day for thoughtful  consideration  of policy matters.
There  is  also  a  geopolitical  dimension  to  this  trend.  In  a recent
book titled The  Nine Nations of North America, Joel Garreau argues
that we are not really a nation of 50 states, but part of a continent of
nine  nations.  Garreau  finds  that  each  of the nine nations of North
America  has  its  own  capital,  its  own  peculiar  economy,  its  own
distinctive  web  of influence.  A few of the nations are allies but many
are  adversaries.  Many  have  characteristic  dialects  and  mannerisms.
The nations "look different, feel different, and sound different...most
important,  each  nation has a distinctive prism through which it views
the world."
This  suggests  still  another  form  of  political  fragmentation.  As
these "nations"  mature and  become  more  self-assured,  they become
less  tolerant  of a  central  control that does  not respond  to their par-
ticular  needs  and  circumstances.  Each  "nation"  also  becomes  more
capable  of dealing with its own problems in its own way.
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ment  is  changing  in several ways. As noted before, transfer payments
have  grown  rapidly  over the past two decades. In 1960, payments to
individuals accounted  for one-quarter of all federal outlays; they now
account for nearly one-half. Furthermore, these are not predominately
welfare  payments  to  the  poor.  Social  Security  alone  accounts  for
over  40  percent with programs like general disability, unemployment
compensation,  veterans  payments,  federal  retirement,  and  agricul-
tural  deficiency  and  disaster  payments  accounting  for much of the
remainder.
The  importance  of these transfer  payments  to personal income in
many  rural  areas  has  been  documented  in  a  recent  study  by  the
Economic  Development  Division of the  USDA's Economic  Research
Service.  In  seeking to  isolate  factors responsible for personal  income
growth  in nonmetropolitan  areas between  1968 and 1975, they came
to  the  surprising  conclusion  that  net  transfer  payments  were  the
largest single source of increase.
As  a share  personal  income  in  these  areas,  transfer  payments rose
from  8.4  to  13.1  percent  over  the  period.  While  the  growth  in
transfer  payments  was  especially  important  in those rural  areas that
had  experienced  chronic  unemployment  it  was  also  found  to  be
important in many parts of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Northern Michigan,
rural New England, the Northwest,  and Florida.
Attitudes, Beliefs, and Values
In  a democracy,  it is  ultimately  the attitude  of a majority  of the
people  that determines  the course  of the government.  While it might
require  a rather  long time for attitudes to have this effect, eventually
they do.  Whether  on balance  this is  considered  a strength or a weak-
ness  depends  on  your  point-of-view.  Thomas  Jefferson  saw  in  it
great  advantage  and  the  basis  for pressing  a great  social revolution.
Alexis  de  Tocqueville  saw  something  else,  the  opportunity  for  a
tyranny  of  the  majority.  Nonetheless,  both  agreed  that  it  held  a
powerful influence over the course of the Ship of State.
Since  attitudes, beliefs,  and values are not subject to measure with
the  same  precision  as,  say  population  or  income,  we  enter  a more
subjective,  less precise  realm.  Most  of  our  information  must  come
from  public  opinion  polls.  Fortunately,  some of these  surveys have
been conducted  for several years, providing comparisions across time.
In  particular,  I  have  relied  on  the  general  social  surveys,  begun  in
1972  with  the  support  of  the  National  Science  Foundation  and
conducted  by  the National  Opinion  Research  Center of the  Univer-
sity of Chicago.
Attitude  Toward  Social Issues.  Has  there  been  any  significant
change in public attitude toward major social issues? Is there evidence
of  a  conservative  drift?  Probably  not.  For example, the proportion
10who  favor  abortion  if the  woman's  health  is  seriously  endangered
remains  high  (90%  in  1980 versus  87% in  1972); the share  favoring
abortion  if the  woman  is married  and  does not want the child  rose
from  40% to  47% over the same period. The share favoring the legali-
zation of marijuana  has increased  from  13% in 1969 to 31% in 1978
while  the  share  favoring  efforts  to  strengthen  women's  status  has
risen from about  40% in 1970 to 65% in 1979.
Racial  attitudes  have,  if  anything,  further  liberalized  over  the
decade  of  the  '70s.  of  white  respondents,  88%  said  in  1980  that
blacks  and whites  should  go  to the same  schools  (compared  to 86%
in  1972)  and  69%  opposed  any  prohibition  of  interracial  marriage
(compared  to  61%  in  1972).  Likewise  with regard to  civil  liberties,
tolerance  appears  to be constant  to slightly higher over the past 4 or
5 years. The only major issue where a conservative  turn can be seen is
in dealing  with  crime.  A significantly  higher share of the respondents
favored  the death penalty for murder (72% in 1980 vs. 57% in 1972)
and a larger share felt that the courts are not harsh enough.
Thus,  on the basis  of what  people  say about  social issues, there  is
very  little evidence  of change  in attitude. And, to the extent there  is
change,  more  often than not it is in the direction of what is generally
regarded  as a more liberal view.
Individual Versus Societal Well-Being. Another means of attempting
to  discover  attitudinal  change  among  the  body  politic  is  to  ask
people  general  questions  about  their  personal  lives  and  the  world
around  them.  If  people  are  unhappy  with their  lives,  it  stands  to
reason that  they  are  probably  unhappy  with their government  and
its  policies.  Furthermore,  given  the  effects  of  inflation  and  slow
economic  growth,  it would  not  be terribly  surprising to  find wide-
spread and growing dissatisfaction.
Yet,  this  is  not  what  most  attitudinal  surveys  reveal.  To  the
contrary, their results picture a remarkably  contented nation, at least
with respect to the major benchmarks of their personal lives. The sur-
vey  results  for 1980  showed that  only  3 percent were unhappy with
their marriages and 13 percent were unhappy with their lives generally.
Over  80 percent were  "very satisfied" or "moderately satisfied"  with
their  work  and over 70  percent were  at least "fairly  satisfied"  with
their  personal  financial  situations.  More  importantly,  there  are  no
significant trends in response  over the past two decades.
One  change  in attitude  that is  evident  relates to the composition
of our standard  of living.  There  is  a strong undertone favoring a less
materialistic  life  and  greater  opportunities  for  self-fulfillment.  This
does not mean that people  are  willing to give  up their cars and their
dishwashers, but they need not be so big and wasteful.
It  is  worth  noting  that  "happiness"  appears  to  be  positively
correlated  with  relative  income  standing  but  exhibits  little  if  any
correlation  with  absolute  income  or with income  growth.  Compara-
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unique  to  the  United States.  Thus,  if people  generally  feel that the
effects  of  slow  economic  growth  and  high  inflation  are  uniformly
spread  among  the  population,  they  do not  lead  to  sharply  higher
levels of dissatisfaction,  at least within limits yet to be reached.
Interestingly,  Americans' satisfaction with their personal lives does
not  extend  to  their  view  of  society  at large.  A high  and  increasing
proportion  finds that  "the  lot of the average  man  is  getting worse"
(69  percent  in 1980)  and  feel that it is "hardly fair to bring children
into the world" (48 percent in 1980).
Attitude  Toward  Government.  How  do  people  feel  about  their
government?  Well, that depends on what you mean by "government."
If you  mean  government  in  general  as represented  by  "those people
in  Washington,"  then  an  overwhelming  share  of Americans  feel that
it  has  become  "too  powerful"  (76  percent)  and  is  "spending  too
much"  (84 percent),  and that "most public officials are not interested
in the  problems  of the average man" (72 percent).  Furthermore, this
disaffection  is on the rise.  For example, the proportion who thought
that  "big  government"  was  the  major  cause  of  inflation  rose from
only  14 percent  in  1959 to over  half in 1978. Likewise,  the propor-
tion who  felt that  "the government  wastes a lot of money we pay in
taxes"  increased from  42 percent in 1958 to 77 percent in 1978.
However,  if  by  "government"  you  mean  specific  programs  or
services  like  health  care  and  education  and  defense  and  protecting
the  environment,  that  is  different.Over  half  of  all  Americans,  as
represented  by  the opinion  polls  in  1980, felt that government  was
spending too  little on those topics. In other words, people tend to be
schizophrenic  when  it  comes  to  how  they  feel  about  government.
For  those  of  you  who  have  followed  some  of  the  annual  farmer
opinion  polls,  this  will  strike  a  familiar  chord.  They  consistently
show  that the majority  of farmers  want:  (a) the government  out of
agriculture  once  and  for  all  and  (b)  higher  loan  rates  and  target
prices, lower import quotas on beef, and free crop insurance.
Despite  this  confused  stance  toward  government,  some trends  in
attitude  toward  specific  programs  can  be  seen.  The most  notable  is
the  sharply  higher  support  for  defense  spending.  In  large  measure,
this  reflects  a  return  to  more  traditional  attitudes  as the  vision of
Vietnam  fades  from the public  consciousness.  In  addition,  there has
been  a significant  softening of support for welfare  programs and for
programs aimed at "improving  conditions of blacks."
In  some  measure,  the  reduced  support  for  social  programs  is  a
function of the general  economy.  Pollster  David  Yankelovich  argues
that  Americans  are  willing to help  the poor  as  along  at the standard
of living of the average American  is rising. That is, as long as economic
growth makes  it a  "positive sum game," the public is willing to share
a  portion  of  the  growth  with  the  disadvantaged.  In the  absence of
such growth, however,  they are not.
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plight of the most vulnerable  citizens in our economy, growing bored,
for example,  with the problems  of race and unemployment that the
nation  had  begun to address  in earlier decades.  At times, our narrow
self-concern threatens to get out of hand," in his opinion.
Attitudes surrounding  the  1980 election  show  no  sign of momen-
tous  change.  The  University  of  Michigan's  Institute  for  Social  Re-
search  as  reported  by  the  Economist,  has concluded  that the 1980
vote  was  "chiefly  an  expression  of  non-ideological  worry  about
inflation,  not  an  endorsement  of  any  specific  cures."  This  would
seem  to  be  reinforced  by  a  recent  New  York  Times-CBS  poll that
shows only about one-third of the respondents approving the recently
enacted  economic  program.
The Political  Scene
Now  let's move  to an  even higher level of abstraction, the political
scene, and try to unravel what has been happening.
The  hallmark  of  American  politics  for several  years  has been  the
decline  of  the  political  party.  In  the early  1950s, just over  20 per-
cent  of  all  eligible  voters  described  themselves  as  "independents."
Now  the share  is about  double  that, and growing. In some cases, the
underlying  causes  for  this  erosion  of  support  are  unique  to  the
respective  political  parties; other causes are common to both parties.
Will Rogers  is reported to have once said that he was not a member
of any  organized  political  party - that  he was  a Democrat. This still
seems  to apply.  Although  one  could argue that this has been among
the  least  of their  problems.  When  they  really  encounter  trouble  is
when  they  succeed  in organizing - to move in different directions. It
is the divisive make-up of the Democratic party, at least three factions
rolled  into one, that has made party unity hard to achieve.
The Democrats  have  another  related problem. Back in 1970, John
Kenneth  Galbraith  wrote a book titled Who Needs the Democrats.  In
it,  Galbraith  described  the  agenda  that  the  Democratic  party  had
pursued  since  the beginning  of the New  Deal. It was this agenda and
its pursuit  that held the attention of the different factions within the
party  for  several  years.  Yet,  as  Galbraith  points  out,  each  of the
major  items  on  this  agenda  has  either  been  materially  achieved
(elaboration  of  the  welfare  state,  support  of the trade  union move-
ment,  and  elimination  of racial inequality),  discredited (implementa-
tion  of  Keynesian  economics),  or  substantially  lost  as a  point  of
political  differentiation  (U.S. responsiblity  as  a superpower and bul-
wark  against  international  communism).  Thus, the Democrats  are a
party in search of an agenda.
The  Republican  party  has  some of the same  trouble,  but in lesser
degree.  I would  judge that their principal  problem is an agenda (free
market,  less  government,  stronger  defense)  that  only  occassionally
13fits the prevailing  set of national  needs,  as  seen  by a majority of the
voters. Fortunately, for the Republicans,  it is an agenda that matches
the current perception of need more closely than in times past.
The  more  serious  problem  for both  political  parties  is  that  the
average voter  finds little utility in the service they perform.  A survey
conducted  in  early  1980  by  the  Institute  for Social  Inquiry at the
University  of Connecticut  found that  over  70 percent  of all respon-
dents felt that there would be little difference in how Republicans or
Democrats would handle a series of major issues including controlling
inflation, energy,  and foreign affairs.
It is  also  worth  noting that the political  scene  has been shaped  in
many critical ways by the flow of events. This, far more than political
ideology  or  party  platforms,  determines  both. the  political  climate
and  the  resulting  policies.  Consider,  for  example,  the  cumulative
effect  of:  Vietnam,  Watergate,  Watts,  OPEC,  the American  hostages
in  Teheran,  and  Solidarity.  There  are  two  key  features  of this list.
First, the  events themselves  are  usually unpredictable.  Second, many
of them are international.
Conclusions
As  is  evident  from  the brief survey  of demographic  and economic
trends,  the  profile  of  this  nation  is  changing  and  changing  rather
dramatically.  Also,  these changes  are  altering the political  landscape
in  fairly  important  ways.  For example,  economic  security  for older
Americans  will  become  even  more  critical  as the aging  process  con-
tinues.  Economic  rewards  for  female  workers  comparable  to those
earned  by  males  is already  emerging  as  an  issue.  Establishing  a  new
balance  between economic growth and a slightly less materialistic  life
style,  in  the  face  of a growing dependency  ratio,  will offer a major
challenge.  The list of emerging issues could go on and on.
These  and other changes are underway.  But are we at a watershed?
I believe  not for the following reasons:
*  Basic human values change very  slowly,  if they  change at all.
And this, after all, is the bedrock of the political-economy.  While this
observation  is  nothing  new,  it  is  important.  This  characteristic  gives
our  democratic  system  a substantial  measure  of stability  and  conti-
nuity.
*  Political change  is  seldom  precipitous.  Despite  all  the  media
attention to identifying political watersheds and the continuing search
for  political  realignments,  the record  shows  that political  change  in
the  United  States  is  evolutionary.  The  current  preoccupation  with
inflation and with achieving  a balanced budget is not of recent origin.
It  has dominated  national  policymaking  for at least the past  6  to  8
years.  Likewise,  support for  increased  defense  spending  and  the loss
of confidence  in many  social programs  has been  evident  for at least
as  long.  And  all have  been  reflected  in  policy,  in  varying  degrees.
14*  Change  begets change.  As  in economics,  so  in politics-change
begets change.  As the political winds change,  so the politician changes
course.  This,  after all, is the role of the politician, to detect changing
needs  and  public attitudes  and to adapt.  Of course, some politicians
adapt more quickly and  more skillfully than others.
*  Importance of  the  unknown.  It  is  a  complex,  unpredictable
world  we  live  in.  As  we  have  noted  before,  a  major  driving  force
behind  the  state  of  the  political-economy  is  circumstance,  often
created  by  an  event  or  series  of  events,  and  the  way  in  which  a
relatively  stable  set of human  values and societal objectives responds
to this constantly changing circumstance.
*  Importance of personality. We  live in an age of little respect for
or confidence in institutions.  While some institutions fare better than
others,  none  fare  very  well.  Among  those  least respected  are  those
associated  with government  or with politics.  Individual  personalities
take  on  added  importance,  therefore,  this  presents  an  obvious
institutional dilemma,  however,  since political success requires main-
taining the  support of  established  institutions while at the same time
not being identified too closely with them.
To conclude  that we  are  not at a watershed  does not mean, how-
ever,  that  the  political  economy  will  avoid  confronting  some  very
serious tests in the coming months. It clearly will.
One  is the  need  for political  coalitions  wherein  narrow interests
subject their viewpoints  to the discipline  of an informed scrutiny by
related,  but broader  interests.  The governmental  system, particularly
at  the  national  level,  is not  well  equipped to resolve  tradeoffs  at a
high  level  of  detail,  at  least not in an  intelligent,  informed  manner.
We  badly  need  institutions  that will help foster the creation of coali-
tions.
A  second  area of concern  is that of redefining  the role of govern-
ment.  Recent legislative  measures dealing with taxes and with the FY
1982  budget  represent  some  steps  in that direction.  Further  actions
are in the offing. They deserve closer, more thoughful treatment than
they are receiving.
The  evidence  cited  earlier  in  this  paper  with  regard  to  income
distribution and the likelihood of its becoming less equally distributed
in  the  future  is  a  sobering  prospect.  If  this  hypothesis  is  strongly
supported  by additional  evidence,  it will provide  our political  econ-
omy with still another major test.
Finally,  there  is  the  overriding  importance  of  achieving  a higher
rate of productivity growth if we are to continue equalizing access to
an improved standard of living for all Americans.
Each  of  you,  by  right  of your skills,  experience,  and  credibility,
can  make  a  difference  in  the  outcome  of these policy  struggles.  It
will  take  something  more  than  extending  information,  however.  It
15will  require  the  aggressive  promotion  of  understanding.  And  that,
unfortunately,  will  subject  you to  risks - risks  of being  misunder-
stood,  risks  of  raising  controversial  issues  and  making  unpopular
points,  risks  of  being  found  unfaithful  to  particular  ideologies  or
causes.
But taking such risks can also lead to a more rational, more thought-
ful,  and  better informed  governmental  process.  For the sake  of our
democratic  system,  I  hope you judge  the prospective  benefits  to be
worth the risks.
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